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Case No. 20150598-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

MICHAEL ROWAN AND REBECCA GEORGE,
Defendants/Appellees.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from a final order dismissing the charges against
defendants following the suppression of evidence that substantially impaired the prosecution’s cases. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009) in the case against defendant Michael Rowan, and under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(b) (West
2009) in the case against defendant Rebecca George.1

Although the defendants were charged in a single information, they
were prosecuted in separate cases: State v. Rowan, Fourth Dist. Ct. Case No.
131402290, and State v. George, Fourth Dist. Ct. Case No. 131402291. Citations to the electronic record in Rowan will be designated by the letter “R”
and to the record in George by the letter “G,” each followed by the paginated
number (e.g., R1 or G1). This Court consolidated the two cases on appeal by
order issued November 20, 2015. Although the district court’s joint orders at
issue on appeal appear in both records, the search warrant documents and
relevant motions and memoranda appear only in the Rowan record.
1

INTRODUCTION
A confidential informant (“CI”) with pending charges against him reported to police that he knew a man named “Mike” who would sell him
marijuana. The CI also detailed that Mike drove to California to obtain the
drug and then sold it from his Provo home in vacuum-sealed packaging. In
exchange for leniency on criminal charges, the CI agreed to make a controlled buy at Mike’s home. In the presence of police, the CI called Mike and
arranged the drug buy. After giving the CI the buy money, police followed
the CI in his car as he drove to and from Mike’s house. The CI returned with
the agreed upon amount of marijuana. A magistrate thereafter issued a warrant to search Mike’s house. In the ensuing search, police found drugs, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, guns, and large sums of cash.
The trial court suppressed the evidence. Although the CI was
searched before and after the buy—and police kept him in their sight as he
traveled to and from the buy—the court concluded that probable cause was
lacking because police did not also search the CI’s car. The court ruled that
the evidence is admissible under the federal good faith exception, but suppressed it anyway after concluding that the state exclusionary rule does not
include a good faith exception. In doing so, the court rejected the State’s argument that the Utah Constitution does not include an exclusionary rule.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis for concluding that the
search warrant was supported by probable cause?
2. If not, does the Utah Constitution require an exclusionary rule for
evidence obtained as the result of a violation of Article I, § 14?
3. If so, should this Court recognize a good faith exception to the state
exclusionary rule analogous to the federal exception articulated in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)?
Standard of Review. This Court affords great deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶14,
48 P.3d 872. The Court’s task “is not to conduct a de novo determination of
probable cause,” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984) (per curiam),
but to “assess whether the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed,’ ” based on the four corners of the supporting affidavit and read in a common sense fashion, Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶14
(citation omitted).
Whether the Utah Constitution requires the exclusion of evidence for
a violation of its provisions is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See
State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ¶ 19, 44 P.3d 756 (holding that interpretation of
Utah Constitution is question of law reviewed for correctness).
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Preservation. The issue of whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause was preserved in defendants’ first motion to
suppress, R27-37, the State’s opposing memorandum, R41-53, and the arguments at the May 27, 2014 hearing, R263-68 (G104). The issues of whether
there should be a state exclusionary rule, and if so, whether it should include a good faith exception analogous to the federal good faith exception,
were preserved in defendants’ second motion to suppress and reply, R7080,151-68, the State’s opposing memorandum, R102-10,129-45, and the parties arguments at the November 4, 2014 hearing, R282-300 (G107).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Const. art. I, § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
A. Summary of facts.
On August 28, 2012, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the
search of the defendants’ Provo residence, which was located within 1,000
feet of a church. R65-66. In finding probable cause for the warrant, the magistrate relied on the affidavit of Springville City police officer Steven Pratt,
who had been investigating the case over the course of the previous several
days. R3,60-64.
Affidavit for Search Warrant
A confidential informant (CI) with criminal charges pending against
him reported to police that a man known to him only as Mike “was in possession of marijuana and would sell it” to him. R62:¶4. The CI told Officer
Pratt that he has been in Mike’s home and has bought drugs from him.
R62:¶4. The CI said that (1) “Mike will travel to California to obtain marijuana to sell here in Utah,” R62:¶6; (2) Mike then “sells [the] marijuana in bulk
and his product is vacuum sealed,” R62:¶4; and (3) Mike “keeps his marijuana inside his residence,” though the CI was not sure exactly where in the
home, R62:¶6.

The facts are taken from the search warrant documents, R60-67 (Addendum A), and the Information’s probable cause statement, R3, G1.
2
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The CI agreed to participate in a controlled buy of marijuana in exchange for leniency on his pending criminal charges. R62:¶5. Police
searched the CI before he left to conduct the controlled buy and found no
drugs. R62:¶7. In the presence of police, the CI then called Mike on his cell
phone and agreed to buy a specified amount of marijuana from Mike at his
house for a specified amount of money. R62:¶7. Police gave the CI the buy
money and the CI drove his own car to Mike’s residence with police following. R62:¶7. The CI drove straight to Mike’s residence without making any
intervening stops and entered the home. R62:¶7.
After a short time inside, the CI left the residence and drove to a predetermined location to rendezvous with police. R62:¶8. The CI confirmed
with Officer Pratt that after going in the house, he gave Mike the buy money
and Mike gave him the agreed-upon amount of marijuana. R62:¶9. Police
searched the CI’s person and found “a distributable amount of marijuana”
in the amount “agreed upon.” R62:¶8. Police did not search the CI’s car—
either before or after the controlled buy. However, detectives working the
case followed the CI to Mike’s residence and to the rendezvous point with
police after the buy. R62:¶¶7-8. Each time, the detectives kept the CI “in
visual sight at all times”—“the whole time.” R62:¶¶7-8.
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Before police applied for the warrant, the CI told officers that Mike is
a martial arts master; he also said that he has heard Mike talk about firearms
and believed that Mike may have a firearm in his house. R62:¶9. Officer
Pratt tried to determine Mike’s full identity before seeking the warrant, but
record checks on the residence and vehicles, as well as inquiries to other
agencies, were unsuccessful. R63:¶10.
Search of Defendants’ Home
After securing the warrant, police searched the defendants’ home and
found some four pounds of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, drug paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, more than $3,600 in cash, and two firearms—an
assault rifle and a handgun. R3,67. The drugs and paraphernalia were found
throughout the residence and were easily accessible to the defendants’ minor child, who was present in the home when police entered to conduct the
search. R3.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant Michael Rowan was charged with (1) distributing mari-

juana in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony; (2) while having a prior
drug-related conviction, possessing marijuana in a drug-free zone with intent to distribute, a first degree felony; (3) while having a prior drug-related
conviction, possessing psilocybin mushrooms in a drug-free zone with in-
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tent to distribute, a first degree felony; (4) possessing a firearm as a restricted person, a third degree felony; (5) possessing drug paraphernalia in a
drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor; and (6) endangering a child, a third
degree felony. R1-3 (G3-1). Defendant Rebecca George was charged with
one count of endangering a child, a third degree felony. R2-3 (G2-1).
Motion to Suppress on Fourth Amendment Grounds
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of
their home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause.
R27-37. In response, the State argued that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for finding probable cause, but even if not, that the evidence should
not be suppressed under the federal good faith exception. After hearing argument, R263-268 (G104), the trial court denied the motion, R269-81 (G105).
In its written order, the court concluded that the warrant was not supported
by probable cause, but refused to suppress the evidence under the federal
good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
R226-32 (Addendum B) (G84-78).
Motion to Suppress on State Constitution Grounds
Defendants filed a second motion to suppress the evidence, this time
urging the trial court to not recognize a good faith exception under Utah’s
exclusionary rule. R70-80. In response, the State argued that there is no basis
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for an exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution and, even if there
were, it should include a good faith exception analogous to the federal exception. R88-146. After hearing argument, R282-300 (G107), the trial court
granted defendants’ motion to suppress—concluding that a state exclusionary rule is constitutionally required and that a good faith exception is inappropriate because it would deprive defendants of the right to a remedy, undermine the integrity of the executive and judicial branches, and weaken
the warrant process, R180-94 (Addendum C) (G51-37).
Dismissal and Appeal
On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against
defendants on the ground that the suppression of evidence substantially
impaired the State’s cases. R241,247 (G92,98). The State timely appealed
both cases. R251-52 (G101-100). After this Court elected to retain the Rowan
case on its docket, R306, the court of appeals certified the George case for
transfer to this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Probable cause showing for search warrant. The trial court improperly vacated the search warrant issued by the magistrate. Rather than
reviewing the magistrate’s probable cause decision with great deference, the
court reviewed it de novo, as if it were a magistrate looking at the warrant
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application for the first time. And, consequently, the trial court erroneously
concluded that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
When the affidavit is viewed as a whole and in a common sense
manner, the magistrate had a substantial basis for his probable cause finding. The tip that drugs were being sold out of Defendants’ home was made
by a known informant, who was thus subject to prosecution if he was lying
to police. Moreover, he was promised leniency in his pending criminal
charges. He thus risked losing the benefit of the bargain if his claims proved
to be a tale. Added to that, the informant participated in a controlled buy at
the home that yielded a distributable amount of marijuana. Police searched
the informant before and after the buy, but not the car he drove to and from
the buy. A car search may well have bolstered the probable cause showing.
But police followed the informant to and from the buy, keeping him in visual sight at all times. Those measures were sufficient to assure that the
drugs were purchased at the home, not retrieved from the car.
II. Article I, § 14 and the exclusionary remedy.
This Court should reconsider and reject a state exclusionary rule for
violations of Article I, § 14. The opinion in State v. Thompson adopting a state
exclusionary rule is bereft of analysis and relies on the plurality opinion of
State v. Larocco as if it were binding precedent. But the Larocco plurality’s ra-
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tionale for a state exclusionary rule also does not withstand scrutiny. It is
not grounded in Article I, § 14’s text; it does not consider the understanding
of Utah’s framers at the time of the state constitution’s adoption; and it is
based in large part on decisions from this Court that applied the federal exclusionary rule, not a state exclusionary rule.
III. Good faith exception. This Court should reverse even if a substantial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause finding was lacking, and a
state exclusionary rule is a proper remedy. The evidence seized should not
have been suppressed because the trial court found that the officers acted in
objective good faith, reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate. Although the trial court acknowledged that the
officers acted in good faith, it refused to recognize a good faith exception to
Utah’s exclusionary rule. That determination was incorrect. Like its federal
counterpart, the state exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to deter future constitutional violations by law enforcement officials. Accordingly, the objectives of the exclusionary rule are not served when officers rely
in good faith on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. Because
the officers here reasonably relied on the warrant in conducting the search,
the evidence should not have been suppressed.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Magistrate Had a Substantial Basis for Finding Probable
Cause.
The trial court ruled that the search warrant affidavit “failed to show
[that] there was probable cause” because police did not independently corroborate the CI’s claims that “Mike” was selling drugs from his Provo residence. R230-31. The court ruled that the drug buy monitored by police was
insufficient to corroborate the CI’s claim because officers did not search the
CI’s car before and after the drug buy. R230. The court reasoned that absent
a before-and-after car search, the CI “could not be excluded as the source of
the controlled substance, or as the person who retained the buy money.”
R230. The court also observed that “[n]othing in the Affidavit suggests that
the Confidential Informant had provided credible information in the past.”
R231.
This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court. Rather than affording the magistrate’s probable cause determination “great deference,”
the trial court reviewed the probable cause affidavit de novo. This was error. And that error resulted in the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the
search warrant was not supported by probable cause.
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A. The trial court erred in reviewing the search warrant affidavit
de novo, rather than applying deferential review to the magistrate’s probable cause determination.
The Fourth Amendment reflects a “strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
When a warrant is issued, the decision that a search is justified has been
made “by a neutral and detached magistrate” rather than a police officer
“engaged in the often competitive [and hurried] enterprise of ferreting out
crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The issuance of a warrant “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the
lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of
his power to search.’ ” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
“A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants’ is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). While warrantless
searches for evidence are “presumptively unreasonable,” Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), searches conducted under the authority of a
warrant are presumed to comport with Fourth Amendment requirements.
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982) (holding that “a war-
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rant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” the search’s reasonableness). For this reason, reviewing courts—trial and appellate courts
alike—“should pay ‘great deference’ to the magistrate’s [probable cause]
decision.” State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) (quoting Gates, 462
U.S. at 236). Magistrates and reviewing courts thus have distinctive roles
when considering probable cause for a warrant.
“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
In contrast, the reviewing court’s task “is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause.” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984)
(per curiam); accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. Its task is only to determine
whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; accord Upton, 466 U.S. at 728; Babbell, 770 P.2d at
991. And under this standard, the reviewing court may not invalidate the
warrant simply because it might have reached a different result. Indeed,
“the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Ventresca, 380
U.S. at 109; accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37 n.10.

-14-

The trial court in this case did not afford the magistrate’s probable
cause determination the deference it was due. The court failed to even
acknowledge the deferential standard by which it was required to review
the warrant. See R230-31. The court instead conducted “after-the-fact, de
novo scrutiny” of the probable cause showing, as if it were the magistrate
looking at the affidavit for the first time. See Upton, 466 U.S. at 733. And in
doing so, the court improperly focused on what police did not do to bolster
a probable cause showing, rather than on the facts that supported the magistrate’s decision. That error resulted in the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.
B.

The magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable
cause in support of the search warrant.
Like the magistrate, the reviewing court should “consider the search

warrant affidavit in ‘its entirety and in a common-sense fashion.’” State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991)
(other internal quotes omitted). As noted, a warrant will be invalidated on
review “only if the magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances,
lacked a ‘substantial basis’ for determining that probable cause existed.” Id.
at 1259-60 (citations omitted); accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. The information set forth in the affidavit, “viewed as a whole,” provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause finding.
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The search warrant affidavit indicated that the CI told Officer Pratt
that he had made drug “purchases” from a man named Mike at Mike’s
home. R62:¶4. He explained that Mike travels to California to obtain the
marijuana and sells it in bulk in “vacuum sealed” bags or containers here in
Utah. R62:¶¶4,6. The CI told Officer Pratt that Mike keeps the marijuana in
his house, but he did not know where in the house. R62:¶6. If “adequately
corroborated,” the CI’s tip no doubt supported a probable cause finding
that drugs would be found in the home. See Upton, 466 U.S. at 731. The
question is whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for crediting
the CI’s tip. He did.
In the first place, there was reason to believe the CI. The CI was not
an anonymous informer who had nothing to lose. He was a known, criminal defendant. Thus, like a citizen informant, he was “exposed to possible
criminal and civil prosecution if the report [was] false.” State v. Royball, 2010
UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016. Moreover, he provided the information in exchange for leniency in his criminal case He thus risked losing the benefit of
leniency in his criminal case if his report proved to be false. See State v. Estorga, 803 P.2d 813, 817 (Wash. App. 1991) (“Potential risk of disfavor is
heightened and consequently a higher motive to be truthful exists where the
information is given in exchange for a promise of leniency.”).
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The reliability of the CI’s report was further enhanced because (1) his
report was based on first-hand knowledge—the CI had been in Mike’s
home; and (2) his report included a fair amount of detail regarding Mike’s
drug operations—Mike traveled to California to obtain the marijuana, vacuum sealed the marijuana he peddled, and sold the marijuana in bulk.
R62:¶¶4,6. Thus, even if “some doubt as to [the CI’s] motives” remained,
“his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater
weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234.
Further enhancing the CI’s credibility was his admission that he himself “has made drug purchases” from Mike at his home. R62:¶4. This Court
has held that such statements against penal interest also bolster’s a confidential informant’s reliability. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d
1265. Indeed—and as this Court noted in Saddler, id.—the United States Supreme Court long ago held that “[a]dmissions of crime . . . carry their own
indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to
search.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (emphasis added).
The offer of leniency in a pending criminal case in exchange for the CI’s cooperation does not alter that analysis. Harris held that the fact “[t]hat the in-
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formant may be paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate the residual
risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct.” Id.
But the police did not rely on the tip alone. Although they could not
ascertain Mike’s full identity through record checks and agency inquiries,
R63:¶10, officers oversaw a controlled buy at the suspect residence that
yielded the purchase of “a distributable amount of marijuana.” R62:¶¶6-9.
After searching the CI’s person, police listened as the CI telephoned Mike
on his cell phone and agreed to buy a “predetermined amount of marijuana
. . . for a predetermined amount of money.” R62:¶7. Police then gave the CI
the buy money and followed the CI as he drove his car to Mike’s home—
keeping him “in visual sight at all times.” R62:¶7. The CI went straight there
and officers watched him go inside. R62:¶7. Officers then saw the CI “leaving the residence” and they followed him as he drove to a rendezvous
point—again keeping him “in visual sight the whole time.” R62:¶8. Police
searched the CI again and found marijuana in the “distributable amount”
that had been “agreed upon” during the telephone conversation. R62:¶8.
The controlled buy fully corroborated the CI’s report that marijuana
in bulk was being sold out of the home. See United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d
1158, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that “affidavit’s description of the
controlled buy . . . strongly corroborated the informant’s claim that drugs
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were being sold from the residence”); United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647,
652 (D.C. 1994) (holding that “police establish probable cause for a search
where they corroborate a reliable informant’s tip about drug activity at a
residence by conducting a single controlled buy of illegal narcotics”).
The trial court, however, ruled that the controlled buy did not corroborate the tip. R230. The court ruled that because police allowed the CI to
drive his own car and did not search it before and after the buy, the CI
“could not be excluded as the source” of the drugs found on him after the
buy, “or as the person who retained the buy money.” R230. The court noted
that “[a] search of the vehicle before the buy could have demonstrated that
the car had no drugs in it,” and that a search “after the buy could have
demonstrated that the car had no cash in it.” R230. The court then opined
that “[t]hese controls might have been imposed with little effort.” R230. But
“an ‘affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on
what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.’ ” United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). By focusing on what police could have done to bolster reliability, the trial court
overlooked what police did do to enhance reliability.
Although police did not search the CI’s car before and after the buy,
the affidavit disclosed that detectives kept the CI under observation “at all
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times” as he drove to Defendants’ house, R62:¶7; that detectives watched
the CI walk in and out of the house, R62:¶¶7-8; and that detectives kept the
CI under observation “the whole time” as he drove away from the house to
the rendezvous point, R62:¶8. And the affidavit did not indicate that the detectives observed anything suggesting that the CI either retrieved the marijuana from his car or stashed the buy money in his car. See R60-64. A beforeand-after car search may very well have boosted the reliability even further.
But the steps taken by police were enough to “ ‘reduce[ ] the chances of a
reckless or prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for crediting’ ” the CI’s report. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45 (citation omitted).
In sum, it is error for a reviewing court to invalidate a warrant “by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner” where—as here— the “magistrate has found probable cause” and
where—as here—the affidavit discloses “the underlying circumstances” upon which probable cause is based and gives “the reason for crediting the
source of the information.” Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109. Yet, that is precisely
what the trial court did. Even if the probable cause showing were marginal,
the trial court was required to resolve the probable cause challenge “ ‘by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109). This Court should reverse.
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II.
The Utah Constitution does not require or otherwise incorporate
an exclusionary remedy for violations of Article I, § 14.
Even if this Court were to uphold the trial court’s probable cause ruling, suppression of the evidence is still not warranted. Relying on the “good
faith exception” articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 (1984) (“Leon exception”), the trial court agreed that the federal exclusionary rule does
not require suppression because the officers’ reliance on the warrant was
“objectively reasonable.” R231-32. The court nevertheless suppressed the
evidence based on its conclusion that exclusion is required under the Utah
Constitution’s search and seizure provision—Article I, § 14. R180-94. The
State contended that the Utah Constitution, properly interpreted, does not
incorporate an exclusionary rule and, even if it did, should include an exception analogous to the Leon exception. R102-10,129-45. The trial court rejected that argument. R191-94.
Citing State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the trial court ruled
that it did “not have authority to depart” from this Court’s precedent that
exclusion “is the proper remedy” for a violation of Article I, § 14. R185. The
court added that “[e]ven if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its
own,” it would “leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in state search
and seizure jurisprudence.” R185-86. The court concluded that two plurality
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opinions—State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and Sims v. Collection
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992))—suggest that the exclusionary rule “holds a more prominent place in state constitutional law”
because it is not limited to “deter[ing] police misconduct.” R187. The court
determined that the state exclusionary rule is also necessary to (1) provide a
remedy for the defendant; (2) “protect the integrity of the judiciary”; and (3)
“create incentives which improve the warrant process as a whole.” R187-88.
This Court should overrule Thompson and hold that the Utah Constitution does not incorporate the remedy of exclusion for a violation of Article
I, § 14.
A. Thompson and Larocco are not the most weighty of opinions.
In Thompson, a majority of this Court held for the first time that “ ‘exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I, section 14.’ ” Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419 (quoting Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472). The State recognizes that it bears “a substantial burden”
in asking the Court to overturn this precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
398 (Utah 1994). That said, this Court “ ‘is not inexorably bound by its own
precedents.’ ” Id. at 399 (citation omitted). The Court will not hesitate to
overturn prior precedent when it is “ ‘clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions
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and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.’ ” Id.
(citation omitted). Nor will the Court hesitate to reconsider prior precedent
that lacks meaningful analysis. See id. (noting decisions that “failed to explain” departure from “long-established” precedent or that provided “little
analysis and without reference to authority”). Such is the case in Thompson,
and in the Larocco plurality opinion upon which it relied.
1. Thompson summarily adopted the state exclusionary rule
based on the Larocco plurality opinion as if it were controlling precedent.
Thompson “is not the most weighty of precedents.” See Menzies, 889
P.2d at 399. In adopting a state exclusionary rule, Thompson did not the text
or history of Article I, § 14, and failed to acknowledge, much less explain
why it was departing from, this Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a
state exclusionary rule for violations of Article I, § 14.
In State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923)—an opinion issued just
twenty-seven years after the Utah Constitution’s adoption in 1896—this
Court was asked to address whether exclusion was a necessary or proper
remedy for a violation of Article I, § 14. The issue no doubt arose because
nine years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had applied the exclusionary remedy to evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Aime re-
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fused to follow suit, holding that excluding evidence for an Article I, § 14
violation by police is neither constitutionally required, nor appropriate as a
remedy in a criminal trial. 220 P. at 706-08. Almost forty years later, the
Court reaffirmed Aime in State v. Fair, holding “that evidence, even though
illegally obtained, is admissible.” 10 Utah 365, 366, 353 P.2d 615, 615 (1960).
Thompson failed to cite Aime and Fair altogether. And it was bereft of
analysis. Instead, it quoted the Larocco plurality opinion as if it were binding
precedent, completely overlooking that (1) the Larocco opinion garnered the
support of only two justices, (2) the Aime holding had been undisturbed for
almost 70 years, and (3) excluding evidence had never been recognized as a
remedy for a violation of the nearly 100-year-old state constitution. Thompson’s “lack of acknowledgement of authority and its weak analytical underpinnings” beg for reconsideration.
2. The Larocco opinion failed to address Aime’s rationale for
rejecting a state exclusionary rule and incorrectly concluded that the Court had tacitly adopted the rule.
Thompson no doubt relied on the rationale of the Larocco plurality
opinion, but Larocco’s reasoning for overturning Aime does not fare much
better than Thompson’s.
Almost 70 years after Aime’s rejection of a state exclusionary rule, the
Larocco plurality opined that “exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a
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necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.” 794 P.2d
at 472. The Larocco plurality acknowledged this Court’s rejection of a state
exclusionary rule in both Aime and Fair. Id. at 471. But the plurality did not
discuss, let alone examine, Aime’s underlying rationale for rejecting a state
exclusionary rule. See id. Nor did it discuss Article I, § 14’s text or history.
Instead, the Larocco plurality based its opinion on two conclusions: (1) that
the Utah Supreme Court has, since 1961, “ ‘tacitly followed the federal lead’
in adopting the exclusionary rule,” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471-72 (citation omitted); and (2) that eighteen other states had “adopted an independent state
constitutional exclusionary rule, id. at 472. The reasons identified by the
Larocco plurality do not withstand scrutiny.
a. This Court did not tacitly adopt a state exclusionary
rule in cases decided since 1961.
The Larocco plurality concluded that since 1961—when the federal exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal trials in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961)—this Court had “ ‘tacitly followed the federal lead’ in
adopting the exclusionary rule” for state constitutional violations. Larocco,
794 P.2d at 471 (quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). In support, the plurality cited twelve decisions
from 1963 to 1987. See id. at 471-72. But none of those decisions can be read
as tacitly approving a state exclusionary rule.
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Six of the twelve cases cited by the Larocco plurality addressed Fourth
Amendment challenges only. See State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d
958, 960 (1966) (affirming trial court’s decision denying motion to suppress
because defendant did not have “Fourth Amendment” standing to challenge search of stolen car) 432 P.2d at 66-69.); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432
P.2d 64, 66-69 (1967) (holding that police entry into motel attic to peer into
defendant’s motel room violated “Fourth Amendment”); State v. Shields, 28
Utah 2d 405, 407-08, 503 P.2d 848,849-50 (1972) (holding that suppression
not required because search of car reasonable under Fourth Amendment);
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah 1986) (holding that inventory search
of bags in trunk of car proper under Fourth Amendment); State v. Dorsey,
731 P.2d 1085, 1086-90 (Utah 1986) (affirming trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence because search of truck was valid under Fourth Amendment); and State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that
occurrence of “a fourth amendment constitutional violation . . . requir[es]
suppression of evidence”).
The remaining six decisions cited by the Larocco plurality addressed
challenges that treated Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights as coextensive. See State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64,66-67, 387 P.2d 240,241-43 (1963)
(not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights of
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motel guest), rev’d on Fourth Amendment grounds, 379 U.S. 1 (1964); State v.
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517, 518-20 & n.1 (1968) (not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in connection
with the inventory of a lawfully impounded car); State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d
73,75-76, 513 P.2d 435,436-37 (1973) (not differentiating Fourth Amendment
and Article I, § 14 rights in connection with a consent search); State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 435, 438-39 & n.3, 513 P.2d 244,246-47 & n.3 (1973) (not
differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in
connection with automobile search); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121-22
(Utah 1976) (not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, §
14 search rights of arrestee); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-70 (Utah 1985)
(not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in
connection with inventory of a lawfully impounded car).
Because these cases addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge only,
or treated Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights as coextensive, Mapp
required the Court to exclude the evidence if it was unlawfully obtained. It
thus comes as no surprise that in the cases cited by the Larocco plurality, this
Court operated under “the principle that if evidence used against the defendant had been found to have been acquired in violation of constitutional
guarantees, its exclusion would be inevitably required.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at
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472. But contrary to the Larocco plurality’s suggestion, exclusion’s inevitability in the event of a violation did not arise from a state exclusionary rule,
but rather from Mapp’s extension of the federal exclusionary rule to state
criminal trials involving Fourth Amendment violations. See State v. Walker,
2011 UT 53, ¶41, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring) (observing that this
Court’s “decisions following Mapp necessarily acquiesced in the federal exclusionary rule”). The Utah cases cited, therefore, did not support the Larocco plurality’s radical departure from Aime.
b. The cases from other jurisdictions cited by Larocco
shed no light on the interpretation of Utah’s Constitution.
The Larocco plurality also endorsed a state exclusionary rule because
“many states had held long before Mapp v. Ohio that exclusion was required
as a matter of state constitutional law when police conduct violated constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure.” Id. at 472. But
the plurality does not discuss the underlying rationale of those cases or why
they shed light on the meaning of the Utah Constitution at the time of its
framing. A review of those cases reveals that they are not as compelling as
the Larocco plurality asserts them to be.
The Oregon case cited by Larocco did not adopt a state exclusionary
rule at all, but expressly refused to address the question because the search
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at issue was lawful. See State v. McDaniel, 237 P. 373, 376-77 (Or. 1925) (refusing to address “whether evidence illegally obtained is admissible”). The
Vermont case upon which Larocco relied held that the State’s search and seizure provision, combined with the State’s trial right guarantee against being
“compelled to give evidence against” oneself, required exclusion of unlawfully-obtained evidence. State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097, 1099 (Vt. 1901). But that
case was overruled in less than five years of its issuance—a fact the Larocco
plurality failed to appreciate. See State v. Krinski, 62 A. 37, 37-38 (Vt. 1905)
(limiting Slamon to the seizure of papers); State v. Suitor, 63 A. 182 (Vt. 1906)
(holding that legality of search not relevant to admissibility of evidence);
State v. Stacy, 160 A. 257, 266 (Vt. 1932) (recognizing that Slamon was effectively overruled by Suitor and other cases and holding that state constitution does “not prevent the admission in evidence of things, the possession
of which tends to show the guilt of a respondent, even though obtained
from him by means of a search without a warrant”).
The other two cases found a state exclusionary rule based on a combination of their search and seizure provision and their guarantee against
being compelled to testify or give evidence against oneself. See State v. Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927) (resting on provisions governing search and
seizure and prohibiting compelling a person to be witness against himself);

-29-

Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 546-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923) (resting in part on
state constitutional provision providing that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him”) (emphasis
added). But again, the Larocco plurality did not explain why the rationale of
those cases should apply to the Utah Constitution. And indeed, as discussed
below, they do not reflect the understanding of our courts at or near the
time of the state constitution’s framing.
In further support of its opinion, the Larocco plurality noted that
“eighteen states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule.” 794
P.2d at 472 (identifying Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin). But Larocco did not cite the cases, examine their reasoning, or explain why they are persuasive in interpreting the Utah Constitution. The fact that other states had adopted a state exclusionary rule is not
reason for this Court to adopt a state exclusionary rule. That must be answered by examination of the Utah Constitution.
***
In sum, Larocco rationale for adopting a state exclusionary rule is no
more compelling than Thompson’s rationale. The “weak analytical under-
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pinnings” of the Larocco and Thompson precedent call for their reconsideration. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400.
B.

An examination of the meaning of Article I, § 14 reveals that
Utah’s framers did not anticipate an exclusionary remedy.
“The scope of Utah’s constitutional protections ‘may be broader or

narrower than’ those offered by the [federal constitution], depending on our
state constitution’s language, history, and interpretation.’ ” American Bush v.
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶9, 140 P.3d 1235 (quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 n.4 ((Utah 1994)). When interpreting the
Utah Constitution, this Court begins “with a review of the constitutional
text” itself, i.e., “the text’s plain meaning.” Id. at ¶10. That said, the Court
has also recognized “that constitutional ‘language . . . is to be read not as
barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed them.’ ” Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
The Court thus informs its “textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers’ intent.” Id. Sources of considerable significance are
Utah laws adopted, and Utah court decisions issued, at or near the time of
framing. Cf. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 65 n.2 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Court has “often looked to laws passed by the First Con-
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gress to aide interpretation of the Bill of Rights, which that Congress proposed”).
The Court has held that it may also “rely on whatever [other] assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process.” State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶37, 162 P.3d 1106. The Court has thus looked to the
understanding of courts in other jurisdictions—both federal and state—as
reflected in “decisions made contemporaneously to the framing of Utah’s
constitution.” Id. at ¶11. And the Court has said that it may look to “ ‘policy
arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist . . . in
arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question.’ ” Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, ¶37 (quoting Soc’y of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,
921 n.6 (Utah 1993)). But the decisions of other courts and policy arguments
are only relevant insofar as they shed light on the intent and purpose of
Utah’s framers when they adopted the constitutional provision. See American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶12, n.3 (“Policy arguments are relevant only to the
extent they bear upon the discernment of that intent.”); Soc’y of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (“Each of these types of evidence can help in divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitutional interpretation.”) (emphasis added).

-32-

In sum, when interpreting the Utah Constitution, the Court must
never lose sight of the ultimate goal—“to discern the intent and purpose of
both the drafters of our constitution and, more importantly, the citizens
who voted it into effect.” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶12. Applying this interpretive framework here reveals that exclusion of evidence is not a remedy contemplated by the Utah Constitution for a violation of Article I, § 14.
1. The text of Article I, § 14 does not impose or otherwise
contemplate an exclusionary remedy.
The text of Article I, § 14, like its Fourth Amendment counterpart,
imposes a general prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
and imposes specific requirements designed to eliminate the use of general
warrants:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Nowhere in the text of Article I, § 14 does it require
the exclusion of evidence in the case of a violation. This point was made in
Aime: “ ‘[T]here is nothing in the constitutional provision inhibiting unreasonable searches and seizures which lays down any rule of evidence with
respect to the evidential use of property seized under search without a war-
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rant, nor do we think anything in said constitutional provision can be
properly construed as laying down such rule.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 707 (quoting
Welchek v. State, 247 S.W. 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922)).3
2. The historical evidence of the framers’ intent also supports Aime’s conclusion that exclusion is not the proper
remedy for an Article I, § 14 violation.
As noted, some courts in sister states had, near the time of Aime, interpreted their constitutions as requiring exclusion based on the state guarantee against being compelled to testify or give evidence against oneself.
And indeed, Utah’s guarantee is similar to that found in the Oklahoma
Constitution. In addition to its search and seizure provision, the Utah Constitution provides that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. But how Oklahoma understood its counterpart in 1923 does not mean that Utah’s framers had a similar understanding. Utah case law near the time of the framing suggests that
they did not.
Indeed, the best evidence as to how the framers understood that provision comes from this Court’s 1912 decision in State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525,
Aime detailed the reasoning of four courts from sister states that had
rejected a state exclusionary rule and quoted them extensively. 220 P. at 70607. It then adopted their rationale: “[W]e are led by the force of what we
deem the better reason to conclude with the vast majority of state courts
that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of means
through which it has been obtained.” Id. at 708.
3
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122 P. 748 (1912)—a mere 16 years after adoption of the Utah Constitution.
Referring to the accused’s right against “be[ing] compelled to give evidence
against himself,” Sirmay observed that “although evidence, including documents and other articles, may have been obtained in a criminal case by unfair or illegal methods, it is nevertheless, as a general rule, admissible if relevant,
provided that the accused is not thereby compelled to do any act which incriminates him . . . .” 122 P. at 753 (citing 12 Cyc. 402) (emphasis added).
Although Aime did not cite Sirmay, it reaffirmed its holding and further explained the evidentiary principles underlying the principle. Aime
held that the admissibility of evidence “depend[s] upon its inherent probative value rather than upon outside circumstances,” such as the manner by
which it was obtained. 220 P. at 708. Under the law at the time, how evidence was obtained was “ ‘regarded as a collateral inquiry.’ ” Id. at 707
(quoting Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11, 13 (Mass. 1923)). The relevance of evidence to the case was the “ ‘only matter considered by the
court.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E. at 13). Thus, in determining admissibility, “the essential test is its credibility and its value in discovering the
truth.” Id. That was “the paramount consideration” at the time. Id. In short,
courts were not allowed to “ ‘impose an indirect penalty upon competent
evidence because of illegality in obtaining it.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E.
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at 13); accord Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904) (reiterating the
general rule that “[e]vidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible,
although it may have been procured in an irregular, or even in an illegal,
manner”).
Aime explained that “[t]he law cannot be justly administered without
a knowledge of the facts in dispute. The purpose of evidence is to establish
the truth in legal tribunals, in order that justice may be done.” Id. To this
point, the Court held that “ ‘the object of evidence is to elicit truth and it can
never be said that the probative value of any evidentiary fact is affected in
the smallest particular by the manner or the means whereby the fact itself
was obtained.’ ” Id. at 706 (quoting Banks v. State, 93 So. 293, 299 (Ala. App.
1921)).
To say that exclusion was not contemplated by the framers in drafting
Article I, § 14 is not to say that the right guaranteed by Article I, § 14 is illusory or that a violation thereof is without remedy. Aime recognized that
“[t]he constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures
is not to be diminished or disparaged.“ 220 P. at 707. Under the state constitution, the right against unlawful searches and seizures “may be defended
to the last limit. The man who violates it does so at his peril, and is subject
to all consequences and penalties provided by law.” Id. But that does not
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mean that “exclusion of the evidence criminating the defendant is . . . within
the scope of the remedy, or the measure of redress.’ ” Id. (quoting Shields v.
State, 16 So. 85 (Ala. 1894)).
At or near the time of the framing, a person subjected to an unlawful
search or seizure was “ ‘entitled to his day in some court of competent jurisdiction and to a hearing of his claim for the restoration of [his] property, and
for the punishment of the trespasser or the announcement that the citizen
may defend against such intrusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Welcheck, 247 S.W. at 528);
see also Revised Statutes of Utah § 5101 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to
“maliciously and without probable cause” secure a search warrant); Revised
Statutes of Utah § 5102 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to “willfully exceed
. . . authority” in executing a search warrant); Revised Statutes of Utah § 4140
(1898) (making it a misdemeanor to arrest or detain without lawful authority). Thus, “ ‘the redress of grievances for invasion of constitutional rights’ ”
did not lie in the exclusion of evidence at the defendant’s criminal trial, but
rested with “ ‘the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal
law.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E. at 14).4 Thus, given these other reme-

Indeed, at the time of the framing, “no appellate court in any state
had excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution.” Walker,
2011 UT 53, ¶49 (Lee, J., concurring) (citing Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious
Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The
Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 803).
4
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dies, it cannot be fairly said, as the trial court concluded, R191-92, that admission of such evidence denies the defendant of a remedy or impairs the
integrity of the courts.
Utah’s framers were fully capable of adding constitutional remedies
where they believed existing civil or criminal measures were inadequate.
For example, among the abuses Utah settlers complained of were the raids
of homes to subpoena a wife to testify against her spouse. Tracy E. Panek,
Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids, 62 Utah Hist.
Qtly 316, 320-33 (1994). In response, the framers no doubt added the spousal
privilege provision, not found in the federal constitution, which provided
that “a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. The framers chose not to
provide additional remedies for violations of Article I, § 14.
***
In sum, nothing in the text of the Utah Constitution nor in the historical evidence relevant to the framers’ understanding of the constitutional text
supports an exclusionary remedy for violations of Article I, § 14. This Court
should thus overrule Thompson and reaffirm Aime’s holding that “the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of means through
which it has been obtained.” Aime, 220 P. at 708.
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III.
Even if the Utah Constitution incorporates an exclusionary remedy, this Court should recognize a good faith exception analogous
to the federal exception.
Even assuming the affidavit was insufficient to justify the search, and
that exclusion is an appropriate constitutional remedy, the trial court should
not have suppressed the evidence because the officers executed the warrant
in good faith. Although the trial court concluded that the officers’ reliance
on the warrant was “objectively reasonable,” R231-32, it nevertheless suppressed the evidence because it concluded that a good faith exception analogous to the Leon exception would be “inconsistent with the plain language
of article I, section 14, and the remedy adopted to enforce its guarantees.”
R189.
The trial court reasoned that a good faith exception would “replace[ ]
the probable cause standard in article I, section 14 with a lower threshold
for admissibility.” R190. It ruled that a State good faith exception might
make sense “[i]f deterring police misconduct was the only purpose of the
exclusionary rule.” R191. But the court ruled that such an exception is inappropriate where exclusion is “constitutionally required . . . to remedy the
individual right of the accused in the pending case.” R191-92. The court also
concluded that adoption of a good faith exception would “undermine[ ] the
integrity of both the executive and judicial branches” by making them
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“lawbreakers.” R192. The court added that with a good faith exception, “police have less incentive to ensure that the request for a search warrant meets
the probable cause threshold, and reviewing magistrates have less incentive
to make probable cause determinations with care.” R192. This Court should
reverse.
A. The Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule.
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that absent unusual
circumstances, evidence seized from a subsequently invalidated search warrant should not be suppressed when the officers conducting the search reasonably relied on the warrant. 468 U.S. at 921-22 & n.22. The Supreme Court
established this good faith exception because the remedial objectives of the
exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—are not served where police
reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Id. at 918-19. Rather than always relying on an exception to the warrant requirement, officers are encouraged to seek the decision of a neutral magistrate on the matter. Given the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for
warrants, “searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally
suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in
conducting the search.” Id. at 922 (internal quotes omitted).
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Only when a defendant can establish that the officer’s reliance on the
warrant was not objectively reasonable will the good faith exception not
apply. Leon identified four circumstances where the good faith exception
does not apply because suppression remains a deterrent. First, it does not
apply “if the magistrate or judge issuing a warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. at 923. Second,
it does not apply if “the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial
role,” becoming, in effect, a member of the search party team. Id. Third, it
does not apply if the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). And fourth, the good faith exception does not apply if
the warrant was “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the
place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id.
B.

The Good Faith Exception Should Also Apply to a State Exclusionary Rule.
The reasons justifying application of the good faith exception under

the federal constitution apply with equal force under the Utah Constitution.
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1. The Nature of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Utah Constitution.
Before this Court can determine whether a good faith exception
should exist, it must define the nature and objectives of the exclusionary
rule under Article I, § 14.
The Larocco plurality did not explore the nature of the rule, leaving
unanswered the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement or a judicial remedy designed to deter constitutional
violations; and (2) whether the rule targets the conduct of law enforcement
officers only, or also targets the conduct of the judiciary. See Larocco, 794
P.2d at 473. Reason dictates, and this Court’s decisions suggest, that like its
federal counterpart, the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to
deter future constitutional violations by law enforcement.
Like the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s exclusionary rule is, at
most, a judicial remedy, not a constitutional requirement. As noted, Article
I, § 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Compare U.S. Const.
amend. IV with Utah Const. art. I, §14; see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
303 n.4 (Utah 1998). Like the Fourth Amendment, Utah’s constitutional
counterpart “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and
purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search and
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seizure ‘works no new [constitutional] wrong.’” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104
S.Ct. at 3411 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)); accord Aime, 220 P. at 706 (“ ‘no authority . . . has suggested that the subsequent use of [unlawfully taken] articles . . . as evidence is in itself any part of
the unlawful invasion of such constitutional guaranty’ ”) (quoting People v.
Mayen, 205 P. 435, 440 (Cal. 1922)). Indeed, the wrong condemned by both
provisions “is fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself
and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of
the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
(emphasis added) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, the exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution can only be “ ‘a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard [constitutional] rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’” Id. at 906 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
Like the federal exclusionary rule, the state exclusionary rule “does
not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings
or against all persons, but applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (internal quotes omitted). In Sims,
this Court discussed when application of the rule is appropriate in civil pro-
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ceedings. A plurality opined that “illegally obtained evidence should be excluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal or if the
exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional searches.” Sims, 841
P.2d at 13. In other words, the rule is not applied in traditional civil proceedings. If the exclusionary rule were a constitutional requirement, exclusion would be required no matter what the proceeding—whether administrative, civil, or criminal—and whether or not it deterred future unconstitutional searches. The Sims plurality opinion also implicitly recognizes that
the rule is imposed in criminal proceedings because of its deterrent effect.
The Sims plurality applied the rule to proceedings under the Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act because like criminal laws, the Act “seeks to punish and deter those in possession of illegal drugs.” Id. Thus, exclusion would work as
a deterrent to future unconstitutional searches.
This Court has also observed that the exclusionary rule “properly insures that article I, section 14’s prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures will adequately protect our citizens against illegal police conduct.” State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶33 n.12, 996 P.2d 546 (emphasis added).
This suggests that the rule targets police conduct only. Indeed, the rule as
first expressed in Larocco specifically targets “police violations.” 794 P.2d at
473. And contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, R188-89,192, the exclusion-
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ary rule under the Utah Constitution would have little or no effect on the
behavior of the judiciary. As observed in Leon, “no evidence [exists] suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the
[right against unreasonable searches and seizures] or that lawlessness
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. As further observed in Leon, it is improbable
that the exclusionary rule will deter magistrates from making incorrect
probable cause determinations. Id. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed:
Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.
Id. at 917.
2. The Good Faith Exception Is Consistent with the Objectives of the Utah Constitution.
Because the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to deter
future constitutional violations by police, application of the good faith exception in no way jeopardizes the rule’s core objective. “Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of [search and seizure] violations.” Leon, 468 U.S.
at 921. Moreover, application of the rule serves as an appropriate balance,
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factoring in society’s legitimate interest in finding the truth and prosecuting
the guilty. See id. at 906-07. The rule should therefore apply “only where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’” Scott, 524 U.S. at
363 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907). When an officer reasonably relies on a
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, any negligible deterrent in suppressing the evidence does not outweigh the substantial interest
of Utah’s citizenry in enforcing valid laws.
The Sims plurality observed that “the result reached in Larocco reaffirmed this court’s commitment to the warrant approach under our state
constitution.” Sims, 841 P.2d at 8. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule actually reinforces the constitution’s preference for warrants. As
observed in Leon, “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question
whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and [the Court]
ha[s] thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately
effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.”
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419
(1969)). Second-guessing those determinations may in fact encourage officers to conduct warrantless searches, relying instead on exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
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Moreover, because the good faith exception includes its own exceptions, deference to the magistrate’s determination is not boundless. See id. at
914. Indeed, three of the four exceptions to the good faith exception account
for the concerns of a magistrate who wholly fails to exercise his or her role
in the warrant process. Thus, the good faith exception does not apply if the
magistrate completely abandons his or her judicial role, if probable cause
was entirely lacking, or if the warrant was deficient on its face. See id. at 923.
The fourth exception ensures that police do not profit from their own misconduct. See id.
***
In sum, application of the Leon good faith exception is appropriate because it is straightforward and fundamentally sound, protecting the rights
of Utah’s citizens, while furthering the interest of Utah’s citizenry to enforce
valid laws using reliable evidence. Accordingly, should this Court conclude
that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for finding probable
cause, and that exclusion of evidence is a proper remedy for Article I, § 14
violations, the Court should find a State good faith exception analogous to
the Leon exception.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Affidavit for Search Warrant, Search Warrant,
& Return on Search Warrant
(R60-67)

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -ALL DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
STATE OF UTAH)
:ss
County of Utah)
The undersigned affiant, Officer STEVEN 0 PRATT of Springville Police, upon an oath
or written affidavit subscribed under criminal penalty, declares:
That your affiant has reason to believe:
THAT
On the premises known as 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 ., further
described as a single family dwelling. That the residence sits on the east side of
1000 West facing west. There is a driveway on the north side of the residence.
The residence has white siding with white trim and a gray roof. There is an entry
door In front of the house that is brown. There are two windows also in front of the
house that face to the street. There Is a brown picket fence that outlines the front of
the yard. That from the street looking into the back yard, there is a black enclosed
trailer. That the numbers 106 are clearly visible from the street by the front door.
The number 6 appears to be drawn in with marker and the number 4 appears
to be missing. That the residence, 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 , is
within a drug free zone. There is an LOS church Jess than 1000 feet away from
the residence in question. That there is also Lions Park less than a block away
from the residence where during surveillance, children have been seen playing.;
On the person(s) of: "Mike" and all persons arriving to, present at, and leaving
from the residence.;
On the vehicle(s) described as: all vehicle arriving to, present at, or leaving from
the residence.;
In the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
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Narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts
in phones, text messages or its equivalent in the cell phones relating to drug
activity, cash, documents, weapons, packaging material, scales, surveillance
equipment, items used for the ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances and
related paraphernalia.
and that said property or evidence:
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or
concealing a public offense, or
Consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by
a party to the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the
crime or crimes of Possession/Distribution of Marijuana and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia ..
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
That your affiant is a detective from the Springville Police Department currently
assigned as a drug detective , and has been employed since 2008. That prior to
my employment I graduated the Utah Police Officers Standards and Training al
Salt Lake Community College. That your affiant has attended and completed the
Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force Training on Interview and Interrogation. That your
affiant has attended and completed the Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force Training
on Undercover Techniques and Survival. That your affiant has attended and
completed the Crime Scene Investigations Course hosted by Sandy City Police
Department. That your affiant has attended and completed the PhanTiaceutical
Diversion Investigations hosted by Layton Police Department. That your affiant
has experience in many previous drugs cases involving narcotics and drug
distributors.
2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my own personal knowledge,
knowledge obtained from other Individuals, communications with others who
have personal knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein, and
information gained through my training and experience.
3. That the Springville Police Department has been investigating a male believed
to be d istributing marij uana into the community. This investigation has developed
within the past several days.
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4. That in the past 72 hours, I met a confidential informant(herein after known
as Cl) who stated an individual only known to the Cl as Mike, was in possession
of marijuana and would sell it to the Cl. The Cl has been in Mike's home in the
past and has made drug purchases from him. The Cl stated Mike sells marijuana
in bulk and his product is vacuum sealed. That from your affiant's training and
experience, individuals who package marijuana in this manner typically deal in
large quantities.
5. The C l has provided creditable information and has not said anything that would
prove false or misleading. The Information the Cl has given has been Investigated
and proved credible . The Cl is familiar with drug distribution and drug practices.
The Cl agreed to periorm a controlled purchase of marijuana in exchange for
leniency for pending charges aga inst the Cl.
6. The Cl was placed in an unmarked police vehicle and spoke to your affiant of
the drug activity inside the Mike's home. The Cl stated Mike keeps his marijuana
inside his residence but is unsure of exactly where. The Cl staled Mike will travel
to California to obtain marij uana to sell here in Utah. Mike lives with his girlfriend
and three year old daughter.
7. That the Cl's person was searched and no illegal items were found. The Cl
then communicated with Mike via cell phone and a predetermined amount of
marijuana was agreed to be purchased for a predetermined amount of money.
Detectives supervised this communication . The agreed upon location was to be
Mike's residence located at 1064 North 1000 West Provo, Utah 84601. The Cl
was given the amount of money agreed upon and arrived at Mike's residence.
While the Cl drove in his/her own vehicle to the residence, the Cl was in visual
sight at all times. The Cl did not make any stops prior to aniving at the residence
and was followed by detectives. The Cl arrived at the residence, 1064 North 1000
West Provo, Utah 84601 , and went inside.
8. A short time passed and the Cl was seen leaving the residence. The Cl was
again followed by detectives and was in visual sight the whole time. The Cl
traveled to a predetermined location where the Cl met with me. The Cl was found
to be in possession of a distributable amount of marijuana upon searching the Cl's
person. No other illegal items were located. The amount of marijuana found on
the Cl's person was the agreed upon amount that was to be purchased.
9. That upon interviewing the Cl, the Cl stated he/she arrived at Mike's residence.
The Cl entered into the house and Mike gave the Cl a predetermined amount of
marijuana in exchange for money. The C l gave Mike the money and the Cl left.
That the Cl stated Mike is a MarLial Arts master and is very familiar with the art
of combat. The Cl has also heard from Mike in the past speak of firearms and
believes there may be a firearm in Mike's residence.
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10. That your affiant has attempted through every avenue to try and identify
Mike. Records checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting
information from other agencies have all been attempted. All efforts have been
exhausted and Mike's personal identmcation is unknown at this time.
11. That your affiant has found that drug distributors use multiple phones and send
text messages to coord inate drug transactions. That your affiant knows often times
drug distributors will use code names in the contact list and text messages to avoid
detection. Your affiant requests to seize phones, contact lists, text messages or
its equivalent at the residence and communication devices that are being used
to facilitate the crime of marijuana distribution. In your affiant's experience, those
who distribute marijuana and other controlled substances often use money grams,
bank accounts or other paper means to launder and transfer money to further
their drug distribution network. Failure to seize these items will result in valuable
evidence to be lost.
12. That your afflant's experience in narcotics investigations shows that failure to
search the residence, outbuilding, curtilage , persons and vehicles of individuals
present and aniving to the residence located at 1064 North 1000 West Provo
Utah 84601, will result in officers missing valuable evidence in this investigation.
That in your affiant's experience, if persons or vehicles arriving, present or leaving
the residence, where narcotics investigation is being conducted, are not searched
for drugs, important evidence relating to the case can become destroyed or
concealed. Your affiant expects to locate the following items: narcotics, marijuana,
paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts in phones, text messages
or its equivalent in the cell phones relating to drug activity, cash , documents,
weapons, packaging materi al, scales, surveillance equipment, items used for the
ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and other items associated with the
use/distribution of controlled substances and related paraphernalia.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure
of said items at any time of the day or night because there is reason to believe it is
necessary to seize the above-listed property prior to it being concealed, destroyed,
damaged, or for other good reasons , to wit:
That it is your affiant's experience that persons involved in the use/distribution of
marijuana or other controlled substances often plan for police raids with a plan for the
quick destruction or secreting of the evidence. Allowing officers to execute the warrant
at night allows a window of safety for the officers and the public in general. Allowing this
search at night allows officers executing the warrant the ability to quickly secure any
evidence that could otherwise be destroyed. That the residence In question is located
a short distance away from a school and a park. That serving this warrant during the
nighttime hours will allow for children playing and the general community around the
area to most likely be inside ..
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FURTHER, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued that does not require
officers to knock and announce their presence prior to entry. The reasons for this
request are:
Due to the information that was brought to your affiant's attention, Mike is well familiar
with martial arts. Mike is considered to be a master and a teacher. Allowing officers
the element of surprise with a No Knock warrant, gives officers a window of safety in
an effort to take Mike into custody. Allowlng a No Knock warrant also provides officers
with a window to safely secure any firearms or other weapons that may be available
to Mike or other occupants of the home.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Is t rue
and correct.
Executed on: 28th day of August, 2012 by Isl STEVEN 0 PRATI
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - ALL DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
No. 1163281

COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit made upon oath or written affirmation subscribed under criminal
penalty of the State of Utah having been made to me by Officer STEVEN 0 PRATT of
Springville Police, this day, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
THAT
On the premises known as 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 ., further
described as a single family dwelling. That the residence sits on the east side of
1000 West facing west. There is a driveway on the north side of the residence.
The residence has white siding with white trim and a gray roof. There is an entry
door in front of the house that Is brown. There are two windows also in front of the
house that face to the street. There is a brown picket fence that outlines the front of
the yard. That from the street looking into the back yard, there is a black enclosed
trailer. That the numbers 106 are clearly visible from the street by the front door.
The number 6 appears to be drawn In with marker and the number 4 appears
to be missing. That the residence, 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 , is
within a drug free zone. There is an LOS church less than 1000 feet away from
the residence In question. That there is also Lions Park less than a block away
from the residence where during surveillance, children have been seen playing.;
On the person(s) ot "Mike" and all persons arriving to, present at, and leaving
from the residence.;
On the vehicie(s) described as: all vehicle arriving to, present at, or leaving from
the residence.;
In the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
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Narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts
in phones, text messages or Its equivalent ln the cell phones relating to drug
activity, cash, documents, weapons, packaging material, scales, surveillance
equipment, items used for the Ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances and
related paraphernalia.
and that said property or evidence:
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed , or
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or
concealing a public offense, or
Consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by
a party to the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the
crime or crimes of Possession/Distribution of Marijuana and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia ..
YOU ARE TH EREFORE COMMANDED:
At any time of the day or night, good cause having been shown,
Without requirement of knocking and announcing or giving prior notice of authority or
purpose, good cause having been shown,
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the herein-above
described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -ALL DEPARTMENT, County
of Utah , State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order
of this court.

Dated: 28th day of August, 2012 Isl
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT

NO. 1163281
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was
taken from the person of"Mike• and all persons aniving to, present at, and leaving from
the residence., by virtue of a search warrant dated the 28th day of August, 2012, and
issued by Magistrate JAMES R TAYLOR of the FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - ALL
DEPARTMENT:
Over four pounds of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms. drug paraphernalia, a Rock
River assault rifle, Glock handgun, over $3900.00 in cash, and buy owe sheets.

I, Officer STEVEN 0 PRATI of Springville Police, by whom this warrant was executed,
do swear that the above listed or below attached inventory contains a true and detailed
account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, on the 28th day of August,
2012.
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which
the property, or things taken, is triable.

I declare under crlmlnal penalty of the Stat e of Ut ah that the foregoing is true
and correct.
Executed on: 4th day of September, 2012 by /s/ STEVEN 0 PRATI

- Page 1 of Relum of Service for Search Warrant No. 1163281 D1ssem1nauon rs restncted to Cnm1nal Justice Agenoes and authonzed non-Cnm1nal Justice Agencies only

Secondary d1ssem1nat1on to any unauthonzed agencies or person Is PROHIBITED by Pnvacy and Secunty laws
Released Dy: SgL W Foster Spnngv1!1e Police Dept.

Released to: Utah County Attorney's Ollice
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ADDENDUM B
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
[Denying] Defendants’ [First] Motion to Suppress
(R226-32)
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REBECCA GEORGE,
MICHAEL ROWAN,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
Case Nos. 131402290
131402291
Judge Derek Pullan

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Joint Motion to Suppress.
The State opposed the motion.
Defendants Rebecca George and Michael Rowan appeared in person and were
represented by their respective attorneys, Ms. Deborah A. Hill and Mr. Richard P. Gale.
The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney Ms. Mariane O' Bryant.
The Court issued its ruling from the bench on June 17, 2014.

1

Having considered

the underlying Search Warrant, the supporting affidavit, and the papers filed, the Court
now enters the following written Order consistent with that oral ruling:

1

At the May 27, 2014 hearing the Court stated it would take the Motion to Suppress under advisement and
render a written decision. Instead, the Court entered an oral rnling at the June 17, 2014 hearing. Neither
party was assigned to reduce the ruling to writing. Shortly thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to
Suppress under the Utah Constitution, which the Court decided on November I0, 2014. The State filed a
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order regarding the June 17, 20 14 hearing on
December 9, 2014. Defendants' objected to the proposed order the next day, stating they were in the
process of obtaining the transcript of the hearing in order to supplement the State's proposed order. A

transcript of the hearing was filed on Deccmber21 , 2014. On May 18, 2015 the State noted that the
Defendants' had not filed a response, and moved the Court to approve the proposed order. Unfortunately,
the Defendants' failed to file their own proposed order until May 26 and 27, 2015. The Court declines to
sign the State's and both the Defendants' proposed order.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 28, 20 12, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a residence
located at 1064 North 1000 West in Provo, Utah.
2. The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven 0. Pratt of the
Springville Police Department.
3. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued.
4. The information supporting the warrant came p rimarily from a confidential
informant. ("the Confidential Informant").
5. The Confidential Infom1ant was cooperating with the police in exchange for leniency
on pending charges.

(Affid avit,~

4).

6. The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in possession
of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript of June 17,
2014 Pretrial Conference, p. 2, lines I 1-13).
7. The Confidential Infomrnnt stated that he had been in Mike's home in the past, but
did not say when. (Transcript, p. 2, lines 13- 15).
8. The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike.
(Transcript, p. 2, lines 15-16).
9. The Confidential Informant further stated that (I) Mike sells marijuana in bulk; (2)
Mike's product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to obtain marij uana
to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence located at 1064 North
1000 West in Provo; (5) Mike lives at this residence with his girl friend and threeyear-old daughter; (6) Mike is a mrutial arts master and is very familiar with the art of
combat; (7) the Confidential Informant had heard Mike speak of fi rearms in the past,
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but did not say when; and (8) the Confidential Informant believed there may be a
firearm in Mike's residence, but offered no facts to substantiate this belief.
(Transcript, p. 2-3, lines 16-25; 1-3).
I0. The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported to be
based in the Confidential Informant's personal knowledge. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 45).

11. The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant provided.
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 5-9).
12. The police did not attempt to co1Toborate independently any of the other information
provided by the Confidential lnformant. 2 (Transcript, p. 3, lines 9-12).
13. Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a "controlled" buy, although
the controls were at best slipshod. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 13-14).
14. The police searched the Confidential Informant's person and found no controlled
substances. (Transcript, p. 3, li ne 15).
15. The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person that the Confidential
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 1517).

2

The failure of police to corroborate any of the Informant's informa1ion and failure to "control" the buy in
which the Informant participated stand in stark contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the

nffiant swears thai " the [Informant] has provided creditable [sic] information and has not said anything that

would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given has been investigated and
proved credible." (Affidavit,~ 4). The only measure police took to corroborate the Informant's claims was
to conduct a buy which they failed to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, rhese
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.
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16. The Confidential Infonnant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana for a
certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone. (Transcript, p. 3,
lines 17-20).
17. The sale would take place at the 1064 North I 000 West address in Provo.
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 20-21 ).
18. Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 2122).
19. For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential Informant-a
known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with police was given in
exchange for leniency on pending charges-to get back into his own vehicle and
drive to the residence at 1064 North 1000 West in Provo. (Transcript, pp. 3-4, lines
23-25, 1-2; Affidavit,~ 7).
20. Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the Confidential
Informant drove to the residence. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 3-5).
21. The Confidential Infomrnnt went into the house. A short time later, police observed
the Confidential Informant exit the residence. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 5-6; Affidavit, iJ

8).
22. Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from the
residence to a predetermined location where he met police. (Affidavit, ii 8).
23. Police searched the Confidential Informant's person and discovered a controlled
substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential Informant's
person. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 6-9; Affidavit, ~ 8).
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24. Police did not search the Confidential Informant's vehicle afier the buy. (Transcript,
p. 4, lines 8-9)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In deciding whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the Court
employs a flexib le totality of the circumstances standard. The indicia of veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge are non-exclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching
the practical common sense decision, whether given all the circumstances there is a fair
probability that the contraband will be found in the place described.
The purchase of marijuana from inside the home corroborated the Confidential
Informant's information only to the extent that the purchase itself was controlled. Here
the buy was not controlled because (I) police did not search the Confidential Informant's
car before the buy; (2) police allowed the Confidential Informant to get back into his car
and drive alone to the residence; (3) after leaving the residence, the Confidential
Infonnant got back into his car and drove alone to a predetermined location; and ( 4)
police failed to search the Confidential Informant's car after the buy.
A search of the vehicle before the buy could have demonstrated the car had no
drugs in it. A search of the vehicle after the buy could have demonstrated the car had no
cash in it. These controls might have been imposed with little effort. Police did not

impose them. Their failure to do so means the Confidential Informant could not be
excluded as the source of the controlled substance, or as the person who retained the buy
money.
The veracity and reliability of informants who have an established track record of
working with the police and providing reliable information in the past may be entitled to
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greater weight than informants who have not. Nothing in the Affidavit suggests that the
Confidential Informant had provided credible information in the past.
Confidential infonnants who claim personal knowledge and who implicate
themselves in criminal conduct may be entitled to greater weight than confidential
informants who do not. But these factors standing alone-without independent
corroboration-cannot in this Court's view give rise a finding of probable cause.
Confidential informants routinely claim personal knowledge of criminal activity and
implicate themselves in that activity
Where there is no independent corroboration, either by the police before the
controlled buy or in the execution of the controlled buy, the State has failed to show
there was probable cause established by the affidavit.
Having determined that the affidavit and factual circumstances did not establish
probable cause to support the warrant, the Court next considers whether or not
suppression is appropriate under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 (1984).
The objective of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment is to deter

police misconduct. When police seize evidence acting in good-faith reliance on a
warrant that later proves defective, the evidence is not excluded because there is no
police misconduct to deter.
A police officer's good-faith reliance upon a defective warrant must be
objectively reasonable. It is not objectively reasonable for officers to rely upon a warrant
when they mislead the magistrate by misrepresenting facts in the affidavit, when the
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role by becoming a rubber stamp, when the
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affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render the officer's reliance
unreliable, or when the affidavit fails to set forth in particularity the place to be searched
or the things to be seized.

In this case none of these factors are met.
ORDER
The Defendants ' motion is GRANTED IN PART. The warrant did issue without
probable cause. The motion is DENIED as to Defendants' request for exclusion. The
officers relied upon the deficient warrant in good fa ith. The good faith exception as
articulated in Leon, saves the evidence from exclusion under the Fourth Amendment.

This Order is the last judicial decision related to the Defendants' Joint Motion to
Suppress. This Order and the Court's Order entered on November 10, 2014 are now
final. No furthe r action by the Court is necessary.

DATED this _..._g~- day of June, 2015.

BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM C
Ruling and Order Granting Defendants’
[Second] Joint Motion to Suppress
(R180-94)

Ftu:o
NOV 1 0 2014

c,,. ,.

4TH DISTRICT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE?~~
U TAH

I

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' JOINT
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

V.

MICHAEL ROWAN,
REBECCA GEORGE
Defendant.

Case No. 131402290
Case No. 131402291

Judge Derek P. Pullan

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Michael Rowan's motion to suppress.
Rowan was represented by his attorney, Mr. Richard P. Gale. The State of Utah was represented
by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Ms. Mariane O'Bryant. Defendant Rebecca George is a codefendant charged in Fourth District Court case number 131402291. She was represented by her
attorney, Ms. Deborah A. Hill. George joined in Rowan's motion to suppress.
The Court previously ruled that (1) the search warrant at issue was not supported by
probable cause; and (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution saved the evidence seized from exclusion. See

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The only remaining issue is whether article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
incorporates a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. For the reasons stated below, the
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Court holds that there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section
14. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' joint motion to suppress.

RULING
Whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule exists under article I, section 14
is an issue of first impression under Utah law. To decide the issue, the Court must examine the
history and purposes of the exclusionary rule under federal and state law. The Court must then
decide whether the Utah Constitution affords Utah citizens greater rights than those existing
under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.

The Fourth Amendment and The Exclusionary Rule
The United States Supreme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks v.

United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court held that exclusion of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was necessary because use of the evidence would involve "a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Court
recognized exclusion as a necessary corollary to the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and without this remedy the Fourth Amendment guarantees would be meaningless.

See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held that
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in state prosecutions.
The Court acknowledged "the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the
protection of other remedies." Mapp, 367 at 652. The Court held again that exclusion was the
remedy for those whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and that Weeks
unequivocally established the constitutional origin of this remedy. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648-49.
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The Court reasoned that exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
necessary to deter violations and to protect judicial integrity. Id. at 656, 659-60 (citing Elkins v.

United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222 (1960)).
In what has been described as "revisionist history"' and "constitutional arnnesia,"2 the
•
United States. Supreme Court in 1974 disavowed the remedial nature of the exclusionary rule,
concluding that its primary purpose was simply to deter police misconduct. United States v.

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). This metamorphosis of the exclusionary rule reached
its zenith ten years later in Leon.
There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion where
police execute a search warrant that is not supported by probable cause, so long as the police
acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912. Contrary to its prior
holdings in Weeks and Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not a constitutional
right of the accused to remedy constitutional wrongs. Id. at 906. Rather, the rule was little more
than a judicial remedy to be applied only when the societal costs did not outweigh the benefits of
deterring police misconduct. Id. at 912. The Court made clear that deterring police misconduct
was the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 916. As long as the police acted in good
faith on the warrant, there was no police misconduct to deter. Id. at 918-19.
The Court recognized four instances in which police could not be deemed to have acted
in good faith,, and where the exclusionary rule would continue to apply: (1) when the magistrate

or judge was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or should have
known was false but for his reckless disregard for its truth; (2) when the judge issuing the
1
2

State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992).
Leon, at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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warrant wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant was
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant was so facially deficient that police cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
Thus, over a period of 70 years, the federal exclusionary rule regressed from an
individual right guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, to a judicial remedy applicable only
when the societal costs of exclusion did not exceed deterrent benefits. Id. at 898.
The Exclusionary Rule Under Utah Law
Two years after Weeks was decided, the Utah Supreme Court held that it had "no
disposition to disagree with the doctrine that where police officers obtained evidence by illegal
methods, such as unlawful search in violation of... Article I, Section 14 of our Constitution, [the
evidence] should not be used to convict a person of a crime." State v. Louden, 387 P .2d 240, 241
(Utah 1963).
Over the next twenty-five years, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged
exclusion as the appropriate remedy for the unconstitutional seizure of evidence by the police.

See State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (1966); State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (1967); State v. Shields,
503 P.2d 848 (1972); State v. Kaae, 513 P.2d 435 (1973); State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244
(1974); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976); State v. Hygh, 711P.2d264 (Utah 1985);

State v. Crisco/a, 444 P.2d 517 (1986); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986); State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987).
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larocco-with two justices joining the lead
opinion and another concurring in the result-"expressly [held] that exclusion of illegally
4
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obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." State

v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (1990) (emphasis added). Acknowledging the changed nature and
scope of the federal exclusionary rule, the Larocco Court identified-but did not answer-three
questions important to state exclusionary rule analysis: (1) whether exclusion is a state
constitutional requirement?; (2) whether deterrence is the only purpose behind exclusion?; and
(3) which governmental officials are deemed to be the target of this deterrence? Larocco, 794
P.2d at 473.
One year later, in State v. Thompson, the Court affirmed the exclusionary rule as
recognized in Larocco, but without further explanation. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419
(Utah 1991).
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule in Sims v. Collection Div.

of Utah State Tax Comm 'n., 841 P .2d 6, 14-15 (Utah 1992). There the Court acknowledged a
"general need for protection of individual rights under article I, section 14." Sims, 841 P.2d at
14 (emphasis added).
Over the next two decades Utah courts reaffirmed the exclusionary rule in Thompson and

Larocco, but did not take the opportunity to further articulate any other purpose behind the rule.
See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ~ 33 n. 12; see also State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102.
Most recently, in State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, one Justice of the Utah Supreme Court
expressed the view that both Thompson and Larocco should be revisited and overruled because
the Utah Constitution never contemplated exclusion as a remedy. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ~~ 39,
46, 60 (Lee, J., concurring).
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Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
In words lifted almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 14
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized."
The plain language of article I, section 14 demonstrates the Framers' intent to protect the
security of Utah citizens in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
intrusions by the police. The provision commands that this right "shall not be violated." Search
warrants-the judicial authorization for police to intrude upon the interests protected-shall not
issue except upon a particular showing of probable cause. Certainly, evidence might be seized
with greater efficiency resulting in more convictions and greater public safety. But article I,
section 14 places a higher priority on the individual right of privacy and security.

The Exclusionary Rule And Article I, Section 14.
Exclusion Is the Remedy for Violations ofArticle I, Section 14
The text of the Utah Constitution is silent as to the remedy for violations of article I,
section 14 committed by the government. But the Utah Supreme Court has already determined
that exclusion of the evidence seized is the proper remedy. See Walker, 2011 UT 53; Thompson,

810 P.2d 415 (1991).
The State asks the court to revisit this question. This Court does not have authority to
depart from binding precedent. Even if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its own,
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this Court would for the reasons stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in
state search and seizure j urisprudence.

Exclusion Is Constitutionally Required Under Article I, Section 14
As explained, when the United States Supreme Court first recognized exclusion as the
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the Court held that it was constitutionally required.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 657 (1961) (holding that admitting unlawfully seized
evidence against the accused cannot be tolerated under our constitutional system, and that the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment); see also Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S.
3 83, 393 ( 1914) (finding that if evidence can be illegally seized and used against a citizen

accused of an offense, then the protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no value and might as
well be stricken from the Constitution). The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule would
deter police misconduct, but this was not its only objective. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. Exclusion
would also protect the integrity of the judiciary and the warrant process. Id. at 659.

In subsequent decisions, the constitutional right to exclusion of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment became little more than a judicial remedy applied
sometimes, when societal costs of the remedy did not exceed the deterrent benefits. U.S. v.

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
However, language in two Utah court decisions suggests that the exclusionary rule holds
a more prominent place in state constitutional law. In Larocco, a plurality of the Utah Supreme
Court stated that exclusion is a "necessary consequence" imposed when government infringes
upon the right of Utah citizens under article I, section 14 to be secure in their persons, houses,
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papers, and effects. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472. In Sims, the Court stated that exclusion was
necessary to achieve the general interest in protecting "individual rights." Sims, 841 P.2d at 14.

The Purposes of The State Exclusionary Rule
While one purpose of the state exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the rule
secures other important societal objectives. The exclusionary rule is remedial for the parties in
the pending case. It places both the State of Utah and the accused in the position each occupied
before the government intruded unlawfully upon the person, house, papers, or effects of the
accused. Without exclusion this right to be secure-to be left alone by government absent a
particular showing of probable cause and a warrant-would be rendered meaningless. See

Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. In the words of Justice Brennan, "The right to be free from the initial
invasion of privacy and the right of exclusion are coordinate components of the central
embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Leon, at 935 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
The exclusionary rule protects the integrity of the judiciary. When evidence is seized in
violation of article I, section 14 and is then used in court, Utah citizens perceive the courts as
either complicit in the unconstitutional acts of the executive branch, or unwilling to accept the
lawful consequences of the reviewing magistrate's error. This undermines the confidence Utah
citizens should have in the judiciary and the rule of law.
Finally, the exclusionary rule creates incentives which improve the warrant process as a
whole. Knowing that exclusion of evidence seized is the remedy for error, police officers are
motivated to provide more information to the magistrate-to secure a valid warrant supported by
probable cause, not merely a judicial signature. Similarly, knowing that exclusion of evidence
8
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seized is the remedy for error, reviewing magistrates make probable cause determinations with
greater care.

There Is No Good Faith Exception To Exclusion Under Article I, Section 14
With these preliminary issues resolved, the Court turns to the question presented: Is the
exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution subject to the good faith
exception recognized in Leon? In this Court' s view, the answer is no.

Independent State Constitutional Analysis
Utah constitutional provisions can be interpreted to provide greater protections than are
recognized under the United States Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465. Independent state
constitutional analysis is necessary to protect Utah citizens from the vagaries and inconsistencies
in federal constitutional jurisprudence. Id. Utah courts have departed from federal constitutional

interpretation in the context of search and seizure law. Id. at 471; Thompson, at 416-17.
Thus, the decision of the United States Supreme Court to disavow exclusion as a right
under the Fourth Amendment and to narrowly define the purposes of exclusion as a remedy need
not define the rights of Utah citizens under article I, section 14.

The Text ofArticle I, Section 14
Article I, section 14 reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Utah Const., art. I,
sec. 14.
9
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From this language, we know that the Framers placed a high value on the right of Utah
citizens to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The text commands that this right "shall not be violated." Warrants authorizing police
to intrude upon these interests-an intended procedural impediment to police efficiency-must
be supported by probable cause and a particular description of the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Nothing in in the text of article I, section 14 creates an exception for instances when a
warrant issues without probable cause and the police rely in good faith on the constitutionally
defective warrant.
Much of the State's brief is devoted to the history behind the adoption of article I, section
14, including statements made during Utah's constitutional convention. However, this historical
analysis provides little guidance. The exclusionary rule was not recognized under the Fourth
Amendment as a necessary remedy until 1914 in Weeks, almost twenty years after the Utah
Constitution was adopted. Utah Const. (1895). The good faith exception to the federal
exclusionary rule did not emerge until 1984 in Leon. Determining how the Framers would have
viewed these later developments in Fourth Amendment law is an exercise in speculation. The
text of article I, section 14 is a more certain guide.

A Good Faith Exception Is Inconsistent With The Probable Cause Standard
Expressly Set Out In Article I, Section 14.
The good faith exception is inconsistent with the plain language of article I, section 14,
and the remedy adopted to enforce its guarantees. Article I, section 14 requires that no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause. The good faith exception allows the government to use
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evidence in a criminal case even though the warrant authorizing its seizure issued without the
showing of probable cause required by article I, section 14.
The good faith exception replaces the "probable cause" standard in article I, section 14
with a lower threshold for admissibility. The fruits of the unsupported search warrant are
deemed admissible so long as: (1) the magistrate did not wholly abandon her judicial role, (2) the
affiant did not mislead the magistrate, (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant was not so
lacking in indicia of probable cause that relying on it was entirely unreasonable, or (4) the
warrant was not so facially deficient that the police could not reasonably presume it to be valid.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. These alternatives are inconsistent with what the Utah Constitution
expressly requires- probable cause. As the Michigan Court of Appeals observed:
A 'good-faith' exception to the exclusionary rule would insulate the magistrate's decision to grant
a search warrant from appellate review. In every case where a constitutionally infirm search
warrant was issued, the prosecution could reasonably claim that the police acted in good faith. In
effect, the constitutional language that all warrants be issued only on a showing of probable cause
would become a nullity.

People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. App. 1986) (citing People v. David, 326 N.W.2d
485 (Mich. App. 1982)).
The insulation of probable cause determinations from appellate review is a serious
concern. In cases where the good faith exception applies, both trial courts on a motion to
suppress and appellate courts on review may simply assume error on the issue of probable cause
and jump to the dispositive "good faith" analysis. This is most likely to happen in the close
cases-cases in which guidance to reviewing judges on the issue of probable cause would be
most helpful. See, State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 677 (Idaho 1992) (citing Silas Wasserstrom &
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William Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 85, 112 (1984). 3

A Good Faith Exception Undermines The Purposes of the State Exclusionary Rule

If deterring police misconduct was the only purpose of the exclusionary rule, a good faith
exception might make sense. As the Leon court explained, the police have a constitutional duty
to seek a warrant and did so. Leon, at 944. Therefore, there is no police misconduct to deter.
However, deterring police misconduct is not the sole purpose of exclusion. Exclusion is
constitutionally required under article I, section 14 to remedy the individual right of the accused
in the pending case. It restores both the accused and the State to the position each occupied
before the government violated the accused's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Rejecting a good faith exception under the New Mexico Constitution, the New Mexico
Supreme Court observed:
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is in a sense a passive right, unlike
the active rights of free speech and free exercise of religion. It is perhaps this nature of the right
and the context in which it arises that make troublesome judicial review of violations. While the
right to speak freely is the right to actively engage in public discourse without governmental
restraint, one does not actively engage in freedom from governmental intrusion; that right lies in
waiting, to curb the state's zeal in execution of the criminal Jaws. When a court finds the
government has unconstitutionally restricted a person's speech, the court orders the restraint lifted
and enjoins further restraint. What we propose today does no more. Once violation of Article II,
Section I 0 has been established, we do no more than return the parties to where they stood before
the right was violated. We do not deem judicial review of unconstitutional restraints on speech a
mere "judicial remedy," nor should we so deem the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized
evidence that Article II, Section I 0 requires.
Surely, the framers of the Bill of Rights of the New Mexico Constitution meant to create more
than "a code of ethics under an honor system." Stewart, supra, at 1383-84. We think it implicit in
a regime of enumerated privileges and immunities that the framers intended to create rights and
3

These commentators note: "[I]t is in close fourth amendment cases that new law is made and guidance to
magistrates and the police is most needed. Close cases are both the hardest to decide and the easiest to dispose of
under the good faith exception; in such cases the officer's objective good faith is clearest. Thus, these are the cases
that defendants are least likely to litigate and the courts most likely to dispose of without reaching the merits of the
fourth amendment claim." Silas Wasserstrom & William Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was
It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 112 (1984).
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duties and that they made it imperative upon the judiciary to give meaning to those rights through
judicial review of the conduct of the separate governmental bodies. As Justice Stewart has
observed, " [t]he primary responsibility for enforcing the Constitution's limits on government, at
least since the time of Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803),] has been
vested in the judicial branch." Stewart, supra, at 1384. The very backbone of our role in a tripartite
system of government is to give vitality to the organic laws of this state by construing
constitutional guarantees in the context of the exigencies and the needs of everyday life. Denying
the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the
same extent as if the government's officers had stayed within the Jaw. 9 The basis we articulate
today for the exclusionary rule in this state-to effectuate the constitutional right in the pending
case-is incompatible with any exception based on the good-faith reliance of the officer on the
magistrate's determination either of probable cause or of the reasonableness of the search.

State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, ifif 54-56 (N.M. 1993) (citation omitted).
A good faith exception undermines the integrity of both the executive and judicial
branches. If prosecutors are permitted to use evidence seized in violation of article I, section 14
to convict, the citizenry perceives the executive and judicial branches as law-breakers. As
Justice Brandeis warned nearly a century ago:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Finally, the good faith exception to the state exclusionary rule creates incentives that
weaken the warrant process. Wrapped in the warm blanket of the good faith exception, police
have less incentive to ensure that the request for a search warrant meets the probable cause
threshold, and reviewing magistrates have less incentive to make probable cause determinations
with care. In the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Whatever else may be said for or against the Leon rule, the good-faith exception will inevitably
and inexorably diminish the quality of evidence presented in search-warrant applications. By
eliminating any cost for noncompliance with the constitutional requirement of probable cause, the
good-faith exception assures us that the constitutional standard will be diluted.
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State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 854 (N .J. 1987).
The Law ofSister States
In holding that Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not include a good faith
exception, the Court joins seventeen sister states which have reached the same conclusion under
their respective state constitutions: Connecticut - State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990);
Georgia- Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-30; Hawaii -State v.

Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995); Idaho-State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); Iowa State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000); Michigan -People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Minnesota -State v. Kahn, 555 N. W.2d 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); New
Hampshire -State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995); New Jersey - State v. Novembrino,
519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); New Mexico-State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993); New

York-People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451(N.Y.1985); North Carolina-State v. Carter, 370
S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Oklahoma -Solis-Avila v. State, 830 P.2d 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);
Pennsylvania - Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991 ); Vermont - State v. Oakes,
598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); Washington-State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991);
Wisconsin-State v. Longcore, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). The Court finds the
reasoning in these cases persuasive.
However, there is no majority view on the issue. The same number of states has
recognized the good faith exception either by case law or statute. California - People v.

Camarella, 818 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1991); District of Columbia- US. v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1987); Florida - Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1988); Kansas - State v. Hoeck,
163 P.3d 252 (Kan. 2007); Kentucky-Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992);
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Louisiana - State v. Ebey, 491 So.2d 498 (La Ct. App. 1986); Missouri - State v. Brown, 708
S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986); Montana-State v. Peterson, 741P.2d392 (Mont. 1987); Ohio-State

v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1986); South Dakota - State v. Saiz, 427 N. W.2d 825 (S.D.
1988); Virginia-McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 1984); Wisconsin -State v.

Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 2000); Arizona-Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3925 (1999);
Colorado - Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-308 (1999); Illinois - 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11412 (1999); Indiana- Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-37-4-5 (1999); Texas - Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. Art.
38.23(b) (2000).
Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court holds that there is no good faith exception to the state
exclusionary rule under article I, section 14.

ORDER
The Court grants the Defendants' joint motion to suppress.
This is the final order of the court. No further action by the court is necessary.
DATED this

/D

day of November, 2014.
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